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This paper analyzes how imperfect exchange rate pass-through aﬀects the
transmission of the CPI inﬂation targeting optimal monetary policy. In the
short run, delayed pass-through constraints monetary policy more than incom-
plete pass-through and interest rate smoothing ampliﬁes this eﬀect. In addition,
imperfect pass-through does not increase the variability of the real exchange
rate for a subset of strict CPI inﬂation targeting cases and for ﬂexible CPI
inﬂation targeting. Furthermore, there exists an inverse relation between the
pass-through and the insulation of CPI inﬂation from foreign shocks, and when
the pass-through falls, the impact on the trade-oﬀ between the stabilization
of both CPI inﬂation and output depends on how strictly the central bank is
targeting CPI inﬂation and on the kind of imperfect pass-through.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E58, F41.
Key Words: Inﬂation Targeting; Exchange Rate Pass-through; Open-economy;
Direct Exchange Rate Channel; Optimal Monetary Policy.
1 Introduction
The last few years have seen an increase in the interest of the international macro-
economics literature in the relationship between the imperfect pass-through of the
exchange rate and the working of the economy1. T h i sa t t e n t i o ni ss u p p o r t e db y
many empirical works spanning over two decades and diﬀering for the countries and
the industries considered which provide evidence on imperfect pass-through2.
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1The expression ”exchange rate pass-through” denotes the transmission of a change in import
costs to domestic prices of imported goods.
2For example, Krugman (1987) considering US imports data in the period 1980-1983 ﬁnds that,
in the machinery and transport sector, 35 to 40 percent of the appreciation of the dollar was not
1The way in which changes in costs pass through to import price is a complex
mechanism, and several factors may play a role in its determination. Increasing mar-
ginal costs and suﬃciently large shifts of the import demand, which are determined
by exchange rate movements, can lead to a change in the imports price that does not
completely reﬂect the movement of the exchange rate. The positive correlation be-
tween inﬂation and inﬂation persistence, and the positive impact of the expectations
of inﬂation persistence on the pass-through (via the Taylor staggered price-setting
behavior), establish an inverse relation from inﬂation to the degree of pass-through
(Taylor, 2000). Also, the ﬁrm’s strategy of the pricing to market (PTM) based on
international market segmentation and the local currency pricing (LCP) lead to in-
complete pass-through (Betts and Devereux, 2000). LCP, in turn, has been justiﬁed
in two ways: by a low market share of the exporter country in the foreign market
coupled with a low degree of diﬀerentiation of its goods (Bacchetta and Wincoop,
2002) and by a greater monetary policy stability of the importing country compared
to that of the exporting country (Devereux and Engel, 2001). Furthermore, the pres-
ence of shipping costs and of non-traded distribution services adds to the previous
factors (Engel, 2002). Finally, as it has been noted by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000),
studies on PTM have mostly considered exports rather than consumer prices so that
the presence of intermediary ﬁrms between the exporters and the consumers is likely
to reduce the pass-through more.
These factors remark that imperfect pass-through may be generated by foreign
exporting ﬁrms and/or the intermediary importing sector. In addition, diﬀerent be-
haviors of the ﬁrms that produce or import foreign goods lead to diﬀerent kinds of
pass-through. For example, if a fraction of the foreign exporting ﬁrms practice LCP
instead of producer currency pricing (PCP), then the overall pricing behavior of the
exporting sector can lead to incomplete pass-through. On the other hand, staggered
price-setting in the importing sector can lead to delayed pass-through.
Taking these factors into account, it has been possible to investigate more general
scenarios regarding the pass-through and reach interesting results on the relation
between the pass-through and the optimal monetary policy3.
In a New Keynesian perspective, considering an emerging market economy with
nominal rigidities in both the non-traded goods and import sectors, Devereux and
reﬂected in a decrease of the import prices. Knetter (1989) for the period 1977-1985 ﬁnds that
US export prices in the destination market currency tend to be either insensitive to exchange rate
ﬂuctuations or to amplify their impact, while German export prices tend to stabilize the exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. Considering the sample period 1974-1987, Knetter (1993) shows that Japanese
export prices adjustments in the destination country currency oﬀset 48 percent of the exchange
rate ﬂuctuations while for U.K. and German export prices this fraction reaches 36 percent. More
recently, Campa and Goldberg’s (2001) estimation for the period 1975-1999 and a sample of OECD
countries supported the complete pass-through hypothesis for the long run but not for the short
run.
3See also Lane and Ganelli (2002) for a survey of the implications of diﬀerent degrees of pass-
through when it is considered also the currency denomination of assets contracts.
2Lane (2001) show that in the case of complete pass-through targeting nontradable
inﬂation dominates targeting CPI inﬂa t i o no ra ne x c h a n g er a t ep e gw h i l e ,i nt h ec a s e
of delayed pass-through, CPI inﬂation targeting performs better. Devereux (2001)
considers a small open-economy with sticky prices in the non-traded goods and import
sectors and compares the Taylor rule, a rule that stabilizes non-traded goods inﬂation,
strict CPI inﬂation targeting and a rule which pegs the exchange rate. He ﬁnds that
in general, with delayed pass-through, the trade-oﬀ between the output and inﬂation
variability is less pronounced; the best monetary policy stabilizes non-traded goods
price inﬂation; and strict CPI inﬂation targeting performs better with partial pass-
through. Smets and Wouters (2002) present an open-economy model calibrated to
euro area data with nominal rigidities in the domestic and imported goods sectors
and exogenous foreign interest rates, price and output. In this framework, they
consider that the welfare costs determined by nominal rigidities in the imported goods
sector depend positively on the exchange rate variability. Consequently, they make
the point that with delayed pass-through, output gap stabilization is constrained by
the minimization of these welfare costs because it leads to a larger exchange rate
variability.
In a New Classical perspective, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) show the importance of
t h ed e g r e eo fp a s s - t h r o u g hi na ﬀecting the trade-oﬀ between output gap stabilization
and import costs and the implication for the optimal monetary policy. When the pass-
through is incomplete because of LCP, exporters’ proﬁts oscillate with the exchange
rate, and the hedging behavior of the exporters consequently links the import prices
positively to the variability of the exchange rate. Then, if the monetary policy wants
to stabilize the output gap, it will increase the variability of the exchange rate and
the import prices. Hence, optimal monetary policy has to equate at the margin the
cost of the output gap with the cost of higher import price. It follows that the lower
the pass-through, the less the socially optimal output gap stabilization.
These models are characterized by a welfare optimization approach to determine
or evaluate the monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, Deverux and Lane (2001) and De-
verux (2001) assume explicit instrument rules for alternative policy regimes and rank
them using a welfare measure depending on household expected utility. Smets and
Wouters (2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) assume an explicit welfare optimiza-
tion framework and derive the optimal monetary policy. A further common feature
of these models is that they either consider delayed or incomplete pass-through.
This paper diﬀers from the literature discussed above because it uses inﬂation-
forecast targeting instead of an explicit welfare optimization framework, relies on a
more complex transmission mechanism with realistic lags for various channels and
analyzes both incomplete and delayed pass-through4. It broadens the analysis by
considering the role of the pass-through in the working of the direct exchange rate
channel for a small open-economy that follows CPI inﬂation targeting. This study
is motivated by the fact that central banks which pursue inﬂation targeting place
4As to the inﬂation-forecast targeting procedure, see Svensson (1997) and (1998b).
3greater importance on a low and stable CPI inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h e yd oo nl o wa n ds t a b l e
domestic inﬂation. In this case, according to the conventional wisdom, and as it is
shown in Ball (1998) and Svensson (2000), the direct exchange rate channel, that is,
t h ec h a n n e lt h a ta l l o w st h ee x c h a n g er a t et oh a v ea ni m p a c to nc u r r e n tC P Ii n ﬂation,
plays a prominent role in the transmission of monetary policy. Yet, this channel is
considered in these papers with the strict assumption that the pass-through of the
exchange rate is complete. This paper relaxes such assumption and, as a result, it is
able to address some issues that have been neglected in the literature.
First, it analyzes the way in which the pass-through aﬀects the working of the di-
rect exchange rate channel and examines to what extent this latter channel is reliable
for the transmission of the monetary impulse in the short run. Such an analysis is
important, as this channel is the only one available to stabilize CPI inﬂation in the
short run.
Second, it considers that optimal monetary policy chooses the extent to use the
various available channels according to their relative eﬃciency in the transmission
mechanism. Then, the following question addressed is how imperfect pass-through
inﬂuences this choice under strict and ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting.
Third, it takes into account that the direct exchange rate channel is also one of
the avenues through which shocks originating in the foreign sector propagate to CPI
inﬂation. Indeed, a shock in foreign output or inﬂation aﬀects the foreign interest
rate, which, in turn, via the interest rate parity condition, propagates to the exchange
rate and, ﬁnally, hits domestic CPI inﬂation. Thus, the third question addressed is
how the way in which the pass-through occurs aﬀects the degree of insulation of CPI
inﬂation from foreign shocks.
Finally, the paper investigates the impact of imperfect pass-through on the trade-
oﬀ between output gap and CPI inﬂation stabilization.
The framework used for the analysis is a small open-economy that pursues discre-
tionary CPI inﬂation targeting in which diﬀerent kinds and degrees of exchange rate
pass-through are possible in the short and medium term.
The following results are obtained:
(i) With zero pass-through, the direct exchange channel does not work at all and
the monetary authority cannot stabilize CPI inﬂation to any extent in the short run.
With imperfect pass-through, it is important to distinguish between incomplete and
delayed pass-through. In the case of incomplete pass-through, it is still possible to
stabilize CPI inﬂation to a large extent at the cost of instrument instability. On the
other hand, in the case of delayed pass-through, a signiﬁcant part of the stabilization
skill of the central bank is lost compared to the complete case.
(ii) The kind and degree of pass-through aﬀect the extent to which optimal mon-
etary policy uses the direct exchange rate channel most signiﬁcantly with strict CPI
inﬂation targeting. As long as it is feasible to bring CPI inﬂation on the target in the
short run, strict CPI inﬂation targeting uses the direct exchange rate channel more
aggressively with imperfect pass-through. However, when short run CPI inﬂation
4stabilization is no longer feasible (due to low eﬃciency of the direct exchange rate
channel) or desirable (due to interest smoothing and/or ﬂexible CPI inﬂation tar-
geting cases), imperfect pass-through has a minor impact on the optimal use of the
direct exchange rate channel relatively to the other channels. An interesting implica-
tion is that in contrast with previous ﬁndings in the literature discussed above, when
output stabilization is relevant, imperfect pass-through does not increase exchange
rate variability.
(iii) There exists an inverse relation between the pass-through and the insulation
of the economy from foreign shocks, namely, the lower the pass-through the more the
economy is shielded from foreign shocks.
(iv) Imperfect pass-through inﬂuences the trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of
CPI inﬂation and output. This eﬀect depends on how strictly the central bank is
targeting CPI inﬂation and the kind and degree of pass-through. Speciﬁcally, with
incomplete pass-through, strict and ﬂexible inﬂation targeting face a more and less
pronounced trade-oﬀ, respectively. With delayed pass-though, the main result is that
with strict CPI inﬂation targeting, the trade-oﬀ b e c o m e sm o r ep r o n o u n c e dw h e nm o s t
of the change in import cost is delayed until the next period. In contrast, when most
o ft h ec h a n g ei sn o td e l a y e d ,t h et r a d e - o ﬀ becomes less pronounced.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 analyzes the relation between the
exchange rate pass-through and the transmission mechanism. Section 3 presents CPI
inﬂation targeting under diﬀerent degrees of exchange rate pass-through; it discusses
the optimal reaction functions obtained and the working of the economy via the
impulse response functions. Section 4 concludes and presents some directions for
further research. Appendix A and B contain, respectively, some technical details and
the state-space form of the model.
2 The relation between the pass-through and the
transmission mechanism
The framework used to study the impact of the exchange rate pass-through on both
the transmission of the monetary impulse and foreign shocks to the economy is the
model set out in Svensson (2000). Yet, such a model considers only complete pass-
through and, therefore, it is extended to take into account incomplete and delayed
exogenous pass-through justiﬁed with the practice of LCP and nominal rigidities in
the importing sector.
The methodology consists of two stages: First, determining the optimal reaction
function for the monetary authority that, coupled with the behavior of the private
sector, comprises all the information to depict the equilibrium; second, simulating
the response of the economy to diﬀerent shocks under various assumptions on the
exchange rate pass-through.
It is assumed that monetary authorities are concerned, ﬁrst and foremost, with
5stabilizing inﬂation and, to some extent, output around some target values. In pur-
suing this task, they minimize in each period a loss function taking the expectations
of the private sector as given and knowing that they will reoptimize in all subsequent
periods.
2.1 The model
The behavior of the private sector is described by an aggregate supply and demand
equation, a real interest parity condition and some equations describing the foreign
variables. A deﬁnitory equation is introduced for CPI inﬂation
The aggregate supply is given by the following Phillips curve






+ αqqt+2|t + εt+2 (1)
where xt+τ|t denotes the rational expectation of xt+τ in period t + τ, conditional on
the information available in period t, πt stands for domestic inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt and
is measured as the deviation of domestic inﬂation from the constant inﬂation target,
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qt is the log real exchange rate measured as a deviation from its steady state value
and, ﬁnally, εt+2 is a white-noise term to capture inﬂation shocks (’cost-push’ shock).
The aggregate demand (in terms of output gap) is described by


















t is foreign output, ηd
t+1 is a white-noise to capture demand shocks, ρ is the





and rt is the short real interest rate deﬁned as
rt ≡ it − πt+1|t (5)
where, ﬁnally, it is the short nominal interest rate used as an instrument by the central
bank and is measured as the deviation of the short run nominal interest rate from the
sum of the inﬂation target and the natural real interest rate. Both aggregate demand
and supply are derived with some microfundations described in Svensson (1998a).








t denotes CPI inﬂation, π
f
t denotes domestic-currency inﬂation of imported
foreign goods and ω is the share of imported goods in the CPI.
On the basis of the interest parity condition amended with the risk premium, the
following real interest parity condition is derived




t+1|t − ψt (7)
where i∗
t is the foreign nominal interest rate assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule,
π∗
t+1|t refers to foreign inﬂation and ψt is the foreign exchange risk premium.




















ψt+1 = γψψt + ξψ,t+1
where the coeﬃcients are non-negative and less than unity and the shocks are white
noises.















where the coeﬃcients are positive and ξ∗
it is a white noise5.
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(10)
where µ, λ and ν are weights that express the preferences of the central bank for the
CPI inﬂation target, the output stabilization target and the instrument smoothing
target respectively.
In this general equilibrium model, the (column) vectors of predetermined and













It is worthwhile pointing out that πt+1|t is a predetermined variable. This is
apparent if we consider the Phillips curve and take the expectation at time t +1
because εt+2|t+1 =0and πt+2|t+1 is a function of predetermined variables.
5As to the parameters of the model, I have used the same parameters chosen in Svensson (2000).
7Concerning the solution of the optimization problem, the tool used is the dynamic
programming technique of the linear stochastic regulator with rational expectations
and forward-looking variables6.
2.2 The transmission mechanism
Transmission of monetary policy to inﬂation occurs via various channels: the usual
aggregate demand and expectations channels that work in a closed economy, on the
one hand, and the channels that are introduced by the exchange rate, on the other.
T h el a t t e rc h a n n e l sc a p t u r et h ei m p a c to ft h ee x c h a n g er a t eo n( i )t h er e l a t i v ep r i c e
of domestic and foreign goods, which aﬀects both domestic and foreign demand; thus
this channel can be thought of as a component of the aggregate demand channel,
(ii) the domestic-currency price of imported intermediate goods, which aﬀects the
production costs, and (iii) the domestic-currency price of imported ﬁnal goods, which
aﬀects directly the CPI (direct exchange rate channel).
Each channel, other then the direct exchange rate channel, needs some time to
convey the monetary policy to CPI inﬂation. With the aggregate demand channel
there is a ﬁrst lag to transmit the stimulus to the output-gap through the lagged
expectations of both future real interest rates and the real exchange rate (that are
present in the aggregate demand relation). Then, a second lag is required by the
output-gap to aﬀect inﬂation through the Phillips curve7. With the expectations
channel there is a lag even though monetary policy can aﬀect inﬂation expectations
immediately. The reason is that the aggregate supply relation requires a lag to
aﬀect inﬂation via wage and price setting behavior. Also, with the channel that
transmits the impact of the exchange rate to the domestic-currency price of imported
intermediate goods there is a lag that is mirrored by the expected real exchange rate.
The only channel for which there is no lag is the direct exchange rate channel. In
this case, the real interest parity condition conveys the monetary impulse to the real
exchange rate, which, in turn, directly hits CPI inﬂation.
We can have a better understanding of the impact of the diﬀerent channels on
CPI inﬂation by considering the case of complete exchange rate pass-through. Here,







t = log of foreign price, st=log of nominal exchange rate.( 1 1 )







t−1, turns out to be
π
f
t = πt + qt − qt−1
Finally, CPI inﬂation, πc
t,f u l ﬁlls
6The optimization problem is reported in appendix B.
7There is substantial agreement in the literature on the view that the aggregate demand channel
aﬀects inﬂation with a two periods lag.
8π
c
t = πt + ω(qt − qt−1) (12)
In (12) domestic inﬂation and the real exchange rate determine current CPI inﬂa-
tion. However, the monetary authorities cannot control domestic inﬂation at time t
as the aggregate demand and expectations channels aﬀe c ti tw i t hs o m el a g s .O nt h e
contrary, they can control the real exchange rate because the direct exchange rate
channel aﬀects it directly.
2.3 The role of the pass-through in the stabilization of CPI
inﬂation
When the assumption of complete pass-through is relaxed, two important eﬀects
occur. Theﬁrst is that the smaller the pass-through, the larger the degree of insulation
of CPI inﬂation from shocks hitting either foreign inﬂation or the variables that aﬀect
the nominal exchange rate (such as the foreign interest rate and the risk premium).
The second is a positive relation between the degree of pass-through and the capacity
of monetary policy to stabilize current CPI inﬂation.
The former eﬀect occurs because a foreign shock arrives to CPI inﬂation mainly
via domestic currency inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d sa n dt h ed e g r e eo fp a s s - t h r o u g h
aﬀects the transmission of the shock. Indeed, this transmission can occur both indi-
rectly, via the impact that the shock in the foreign variable exerts upon the nominal
exchange rate (for instance in the case in which the foreign variable aﬀects the foreign
interest rate, which, in turn, through the interest parity condition, aﬀects the nominal
exchange rate) and directly, in the case of a shock in foreign price. In both cases,
the degree of pass-through determines how much of the shock arrives to domestic
currency inﬂation of imported goods.
The latter eﬀect, the positive relation between the degree of pass-through and
the capacity of monetary policy to stabilize current CPI inﬂation, occurs because the
possibility to aﬀect current CPI inﬂation is based exclusively on the availability of the
direct exchange rate channel. This channel works best if the pass-through is complete
and works not at all when there is no pass-through. In the limiting case in which there
is no pass-through, domestic-currency inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d si sn o ta ﬀected by
a change of import costs. As a result, the monetary authorities completely lose the
capacity to stabilize current CPI inﬂation by aﬀecting domestic-currency inﬂation of
imported goods. In addition, as will be explained below, also assuming imperfect
pass-through, the capacity of monetaryp o l i c yt os t a b i l i z ec u r r e n tC P Ii n ﬂation is
still corrupted.
It is worthwhile noting that the degree of pass-through exerts two opposite eﬀects
on the stability of CPI inﬂation. On the one hand, it negatively aﬀects the insu-
lation of CPI inﬂation from foreign shocks; on the other hand, it positively aﬀects
the capacity of monetary policy to stabilize CPI inﬂation. This could lead to the
conclusion that the degree of pass-through is of second order relevance because these
9two opposite eﬀects, roughly, oﬀset each other. However, this would be misleading,
as CPI inﬂation, described by (6), is a weighted average of domestic inﬂation and do-
mestic currency inﬂation of imported goods. Then, with imperfect pass-through, CPI
inﬂation tends to be shielded by the aforementioned shocks, but it remains exposed
to all the shocks that can aﬀect domestic inﬂation, for example a cost-push shock,
with a limited possibility of using monetary policy to absorb them in the short run.
2.3.1 The relaxation of the complete pass-through hypothesis
The crucial role played by the pass-through in the stabilization of current CPI inﬂa-
tion can be shown by introducing a new hypothesis on the way in which the pass-
through occurs. Here, (11) is replaced by
p
f








, δ1, δ2 ∈ [0,1], δ1 + δ2 ∈ (0,1] (13)
This equation allows the consideration of diﬀerent hypotheses on incomplete and
delayed pass-through and, although it does not stem from an explicit optimization,
it can be justiﬁed by LCP in the foreign exporting sector and staggered price setting
in the retails sector. If there is a shock in t to import costs, δ1 of the shock passes-
through to p
f
t and δ2 to p
f
t+1. Thus, with δ1 ∈ [0,1) and δ2 =0 , the monetary
authorities face the cases of incomplete pass-through, which is more likely to occur
when some exporting ﬁrms practice LCP. Instead, with δ1 ∈ [0,1] and δ2 ∈ (0,1],
they face the cases of delayed pass-through, more likely with staggered price setting.
In addition, the degree of pass-through in the subsequent periods depends on the
persistence of the shock. For example, if the shocks occur both at time t and t +1 ,
the response of p
f
t+1 will be stronger than the response of p
f
t and equal to δ2 times
the ﬁrst shock plus δ1 times the second shock, consistent with the idea that in the
medium term the pass-through tends to be complete8.
When δ1 =1and δ2 =0 , (13) boils down to (11) and we have the benchmark case
of complete pass—through with CPI inﬂa t i o nd e t e r m i n e db y( 1 2 ) ,w h i c hi st h ec a s e
considered in Svensson (2000). Otherwise, domestic-currency inﬂation of imported







t−1 = δ1πt + δ2πt−1 + δ2 (qt−1 − qt−2)+δ1 (qt − qt−1)
and CPI inﬂation is given by
π
c
t =[ 1+ω(δ1 − 1)]πt + ωδ2πt−1 + ωδ2 (qt−1 − qt−2)+ωδ1 (qt − qt−1) (14)
In this general equilibrium model, shocks may occur at the beginning of period t
and, when this is the case, the vector of current predetermined variables is updated
to take them into account. It is assumed that the information set for the monetary
authorities comprises current predetermined variable (and so current shocks) and
8See Campa and Goldberg (2001).
10previous predetermined variables. If a shock occurs, the optimal monetary policy
responds to it and this, ﬁnally, results in the vector of forward-looking variables at
period t.
Now, in order to aﬀect πc
t at time t the only variable that the monetary policy
can control in equation (14) is qt. Indeed, this variable is the only forward-looking
variable, all the others being predetermined variables. Hence, when there is no pass-
t h r o u g hi nt h eﬁrst period, δ1 =0 , current CPI inﬂation is no longer a function of qt
and becomes a linear function of predetermined variables, acquiring itself the nature
of a predetermined variable. It follows that it is impossible for the monetary policy
to aﬀect CPI inﬂation at time t.
3C P I i n ﬂation targeting under diﬀerent degree of
pass-through
3.1 Optimal monetary policy
In what follows two kinds of CPI inﬂation targeting are analyzed: 1. strict CPI inﬂa-
tion targeting, which occurs when the only objective of the central bank is to stabilize
CPI inﬂation in the shortest time horizon, and 2. ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting,
where the overriding objective is to stabilize CPI inﬂa t i o nb u tt h e r ei sa l s os o m e
concern for output-gap stabilization, which results in a more gradual stabilization of
CPI inﬂation. These two cases occur, respectively, when in the loss function of the
monetary authorities, eq. (10), it is set (µ =1 , λ =0and ν =0 )and (µ =1 , λ =0 .5
and ν =0 ) .
For this kind of optimization a general closed form solution does not exist. Yet, via













reported in Table 1 for the considered cases. The ﬁrst and the second part of the
table report the reaction function for the case of strict and ﬂexible CPI inﬂation
targeting respectively. The parameters δ1 and δ2 determine the kind and degree of
pass-through. The case of complete pass-through, δ1 =1 , δ2 =0 , is the benchmark
case.
Table 1. Reaction-function coeﬃcients




t qt−1 qt−2 it−1 πt+1|t
Comp., δ1=1, δ2=0 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.33
Incom., δ1=0.5,δ2=0 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.66
Delay.,δ1=0.6,δ2=0.4 2.59 0.44 0.00 -0.80 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -0.44 0.00 -3.89
Delay.,δ1=0.4,δ2=0.6 1.85 0.45 -0.16 -0.64 0.09 1.00 1.22 0.09 0.35 -0.45 0.00 -2.33
Flexible CPI cases
Comp., δ1=1, δ2=0 0.73 0.00 -0.27 -0.50 0.15 1.00 1.42 0.28 -0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.70
Incom., δ1=0.5,δ2=0 1.51 0.00 -0.31 -0.40 0.20 1.00 1.57 0.38 -0.27 0.00 0.00 -1.39
Delay.,δ1=0.5,δ2=0.5 3.67 0.80 0.50 -0.91 -0.06 1.00 0.84 -0.02 0.86 -0.80 0.00 -3.51
Overall, the qualitative response of the monetary policy instrument to the pre-
determined variables is rather stable when the pass-through varies. However, the
quantitative side exhibits some considerable changes. To obtain some insight, we can
exploit the fact that for the cases of strict CPI inﬂation targeting in which is possible
to stabilize CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period, there is an analytical characterization of
the solution and the inﬂation targeting operating procedure, described by Svensson
(1997), allows to ﬁnd it.
3.1.1 Characterization of the solution for the cases of short run CPI
stabilization
Consider the strict CPI inﬂation targeting case and suppose that it is possible to
stabilize CPI inﬂation in any periods t+τ, τ ≥ 0. Then, in any period t the optimal




τ=0 so as to obtain
π
c













































Equation (17) shows how the interest rate reacts to the predetermined variables. To
complete the characterization of the optimal monetary policy for the cases in which is
feasible to stabilize CPI inﬂation in the short run, we can refer, for sake of simplicity,
12to the benchmark case of complete pass-through, i. e. δ1 =1 , δ2 =0 . In the appendix
A is reported the extension to the general case.
















Recalling that the real exchange rate is measured as a deviation from its steady










where the only predetermined variable is πt+1|t.S i n c eqt−1 is a predetermined variable,
without loss of generality we can assume that in period t − 1 the economy was in





This equation says that a necessary condition to have πc
t =0and πc
t+1|t =0is
that the central bank determine expectations on domestic inﬂation from period t+2
on in a way such that their sum is equal to −(πt + πt+1|t) which is predetermined.
The central bank can determine these expectations because they are forward looking
variables. What does this mean in terms of the interest rates? From (21) and the




















Recalling that the foreign variables and the risk premium are exogenous in the
model, it turns out that the right hand side of (22) is predetermined. Thus this
equation establishes a condition that the sum of current and expected future interest
rates have to satisfy to guarantee πc
t =0 . Speciﬁcally, since (ω < 1), if there is
a positive shock to inﬂation, then the central bank has to rise the sum of all the
current and expected interest rates in a proportional way. This condition together
with the reaction function (17) completely characterizes the optimal monetary policy
when the central bank can stabilize CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h es h o r tr u na n dδ1 =1 , δ2 =0 .
13Equation (17) and the generalization of equation (22) reported in appendix A
hold for all the strict CPI inﬂation targeting cases in which it is feasible to stabilize
CPI inﬂation in the short run. These cases turn out to be complete and incomplete
pass-through for δ1 ≥ 0.1 and delayed pass-through with δ1 ≥ 0.52 and δ2 =1− δ1.
Hence, for these cases, the coeﬃcients in Table 1 and in equation (17) are the same.
3.1.2 Monetary policy analysis
Now let us deﬁne, in general terms, the eﬃciency of a channel as its capacity to
convey a certain impulse. Then, once the pass-through is no longer complete, the
eﬃciency of the direct exchange rate channel decreases. Indeed, according to (14),
the direct exchange rate channel conveys only
∂πc
t
∂qt = ωδ1 of an impulse instead of ω
in the case of complete pass-through.
With complete pass-through, full stabilization of CPI inﬂation is carried out by
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ec h a n n e l ,a n dt h i se x p l a i n st h el a r g ea b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient
of πt+1|t and the zero values for all the other coeﬃcients of the predetermined variables
that do not enter in the real interest parity condition. In the incomplete case, when
the pass-through falls, for example, to δ1 =0 .5, the direct exchange rate channel
becomes less eﬃcient, but it can still stabilize πc in the short run with a monetary






∂δ1 > 0 in (17). However, in
the cases of delayed pass-through with δ1 < 0.52, equation (17) fails. Here, no matter
how aggressive the monetary policy is, the direct exchange rate channel can no longer
stabilize πc in the short run, and the other channels, which take longer lags in the
transmission mechanism, enter into the stabilization of πc in the medium and long
term. This change in the transmission mechanism is reﬂe c t e di nt h em o n e t a r yp o l i c y
reported in Table 1 by the presence of the coeﬃcients for y and yn
t and by the lower
size, in absolute value, of the coeﬃcients of πt and πt+1|t, contrary to what equation
(17) indicates. For this case of delayed pass-through, since an analytical version of
the reaction function is not available, we use the impulse response functions reported
in subsection 3.2 to describe the relation between the pass-through and the optimal
monetary policy.
In the ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting cases, the stabilization of the output gap
becomes important and, consequently, it is no longer possible to have current and
future expected CPI inﬂation equal to zero. Then, as in the previous cases, the
impulse response functions will be useful to describe the relation between the pass-
through and the optimal monetary policy. Yet some preliminary remarks are possible.
First, by comparing ﬂexible with strict CPI inﬂation targeting, the absolute value of
the coeﬃcient of πt+1|t is much lower indicating a smaller role played by the direct
exchange rate channel in the transmission mechanism. Second, by comparing delayed
with complete pass-through, some qualitative changes stand out, which suggest a
change in the optimal monetary policy.
It is interesting to note that for all the cases reported in Table 1, the coeﬃcient
14of πt+1|t is negative. This result seems counter-intuitive because states that when a
positive shock to πt occurs and, consequently πt+1|t rises through the Phillips curve,
the central bank should cut the interest rate. The simplest way to explain it is to
consider the case δ1 =1 , δ2 =0and recall that the reaction function (17) has been
determined combining three conditions: πc
t =0 , πc
t+1|t =0 , and the real interest
parity. Since πc
t+1|t =0is equivalent to equation (19), which can be rewritten as




a positive shock to πt,a n dt h e r e f o r et oπt+1|t, requires a proportional expected appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate. Then, combining (23) with the real interest parity
(7), and assuming that the foreign variables and the risk premium do not change,
this appreciation can occur if and only if the central bank decreases the interest rate
in a way proportional to πt+1|t.
Finally, it is worth noting that to have clearer results, so far the analysis has been
carried out assuming that the central bank does not care about smoothing the interest
rate, i.e. setting ν =0in (10). Introducing interest smoothing, i.e. ν > 0, constrains
the manoeuvre of the interest rate and as a result the capacity of the central bank to
stabilize CPI inﬂation in the short run decreases.
3.1.3 Optimal use of the direct exchange rate channel and pass-through
It is important to note that a decrease of the pass-through aﬀects the eﬃciency of
the direct exchange rate channel only. When short run CPI inﬂation stabilization is
no longer feasible (delayed pass-through case with δ1 < 0.52) or desirable (interest
smoothing and/or ﬂexible inﬂation targeting cases) the decrease of the pass-through
results in the optimal monetary policy resorting less on the direct exchange channel
and more on the other remaining channels. The simplest way to illustrate this point
is to consider the strict CPI inﬂation targeting case with incomplete pass-through
and a small weight given to the interest smoothing objective, ν =0 .0001. Figure 1 a,
b, and c, show, respectively, the unconditional standard deviations of π and i and the
short run value of CPI inﬂation, πc
1, after a cost-push shock for an increasing level of
pass-through9.
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Figure 1. Std(i), Std(π)a n dπc
1 for an increasing δ1.
When δ1 > 0.07, optimal monetary policy stabilizes πc mainly via the direct
exchange rate channel and, secondarily, via the other channels, for simplicity’s sake,
the aggregate demand channel. The fast rise in the variability of i (Figure 1, a)
reﬂects the large change in i required by the low and declining eﬃciency of the direct
exchange rate channel to stabilize πc. The slightly declining variability of π (Figure 1,
b) reﬂects a minor use of the aggregate demand channel that allows πc to be stabilized
in the next periods. The low values of πc
1 (Figure 1, c) show that the direct exchange
rate channel, even if low eﬃcient, plays the main role in the stabilization of πc.
When δ1 < 0.07, on the other hand, the low eﬃciency of the direct exchange
rate channel causes a too high cost in terms of interest smoothing, making no longer
optimal for monetary policy to stabilize πc mainly with this channel. Consequently,
the aggregate demand channel plays a larger role in the stabilization of πc. Indeed,
the variability of the monetary instrument falls sharply, denoting the minor use of
t h ed i r e c te x c h a n g er a t ec h a n n e l ,a n dt h ev a r i a b i l i t yo fπ decreases more quickly,
reﬂecting the larger role played by the aggregate demand channel.
In synthesis, a lower pass-through implies that the optimal CPI inﬂation targeting
policy tend to exploit the direct exchange channel less and the other channels more.
3.2 Impulse responses
In Figures (2-5) the impulse responses for the two targeting cases under diﬀerent
assumptions on the pass-through are reported. They are generated assuming that
the economy is in steady state and then is hit by a certain shock. The various shocks
are present in equations (1-3) and (8-9) and their value is set equal to 1.
In each ﬁgure, the ﬁrst and the second column refer, respectively, to the cases of
complete and incomplete pass-through and the third and the fourth column to the
cases of delayed pass-through. For the strict and ﬂexible case, Figure 2 and 4 report
the impulse responses to a cost-push shock and Figure 3 and 5 the impulse responses
to a foreign inﬂation shock.
In the various cases, interest smoothing is sometimes introduced, and the choice of
ν balances two contrasting goals: To avoid a completely unrealistic monetary policy,
16which may occur for values of ν that are too low and, on the other hand, to avoid
an ineﬃcient monetary policy as to the stabilization of CPI inﬂation, which, instead,
occurs when ν is not suﬃciently small.
3.2.1 Strict CPI inﬂation targeting
Before carrying out this analysis, it is useful to remember that in this model shocks
occur at the beginning of period 1 and the vector of predetermined variables depends
on them (and on previous variables). Then, the monetary authorities react to the
shock through the optimal reaction function and this, ﬁnally, determines the value in
period 1 of the forward-looking variables.
L e tu ss t a r tb yc o n s i d e r i n gi ns t r i c tC P Ii n ﬂation targeting a cost-push shock under
the assumption that the pass-through is complete, i.e. δ1 =1and δ2 =0in (14),
(Figure 2, column 1). To asses the extent to which monetary policy is able to absorb
the shock via the direct exchange rate channel, we can consider the initial variation
of both the real exchange rate, ∆qini, and CPI inﬂation, ∆πc
ini, occurring before the
setting of the monetary instrument. Since the real exchange rate and CPI inﬂation
are forward-looking variables10,t h e i rﬁrst period values, q1 and πc
1, are determined
after the interest rate is set. Thus, the diﬀerence between the CPI inﬂation after and
before the setting of the monetary instrument represents a measure of how much the
direct exchange rate channel can absorb the shock in the ﬁrst period. Now, when a
cost-push shock occurs, domestic inﬂation rises to 1 (row 2). By deﬁnition, there is a
decrease of the real exchange rate, ∆qini = −1, and, consequently, CPI inﬂation rises
by ∆πc
ini = ∆π1 −ω∆qini =0 .7 according to (14)11. Then, the response of monetary
policy is (i) to cut the current nominal interest rate i1, (row 4), in a way proportional
to π2|1 in order to determine the expected real appreciation of the exchange rate
that guarantees πc





so that condition (22) is satisﬁed12.S i n c e πt+1|t is predetermined when the shock
occurs, there is a decrease of the real interest rate (row 5). Finally, there is a second
real appreciation of the exchange rate (equal to −2.2) which, together with the ﬁrst
appreciation, brings the ﬁr s tp e r i o dv a l u eo ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t et o−3.2,( r o w6 ) .
According to (14), this second appreciation reduces CPI inﬂation by ω2.2=0 .66
and, as a result, the ﬁrst period value of CPI inﬂation is 0.04 (row 1). Under the
assumption that the pass-through is complete, the direct exchange rate channel has
been the only channel capable of countering the shock in the same period in which
10CPI inﬂation is a linear function of a state variable and a forward-looking variable. Thus, it is
a dependent forward-looking variable.
11Another way to see this intermediate change is to refer directly to equation (6). In (6), before
that the interest rate is set, the intermediate change of CPI inﬂation is given by the variation of
domestic inﬂation times the share of domestic goods in the CPI.
12Since in this case ν =0 .05 and the analytical reaction function holds for ν =0but becomes an
approximation of the one found by numerical analysis for low values of ν, we have i1 larger than the
value that we would have if ν =0 .
17it has occurred. Speciﬁcally, it has absorbed more than 94% of the shock, thereby
stabilizing CPI inﬂation almost completely. From the second period on, the decrease
in the real interest rate and the large appreciation of the exchange rate determine
the descent of the output gap (row 3), and the aggregate demand channel starts to
work, thereby placing itself side by side to the direct exchange rate channel in the
stabilization of CPI inﬂation in the subsequent periods.
The second appreciation of the real exchange rate follows directly from (18). Yet
this result deserves some special attention because it could seem counter-intuitive that
a cut of the interest rate determines an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The
intuition for how the exchange rate appreciation comes about is that what matters is
not only the current interest rate it but the whole monetary policy, i. e. the sequence ©
it+τ|t
ª∞
τ=0 , speciﬁcally, the sum of all the interest rates decided at time t. To see this
point, we can solve the interest parity forward for qt and obtain










































Then, given the foreign variables and the risk premium, the current real exchange
rate depends on the sum of the current real interest rate and all the expected real
interest rates that the central bank decides in period t. With a shock in domestic
inﬂation the sum of the nominal interest rate is positive, as it is shown by condition
(22) and the sum of expected inﬂation is negative, as it is shown by equation (21).
Then, the central bank is, overall, raising the real interest rates leading the real
exchange rate to appreciate.
When the pass-through is incomplete, with δ1 =0 .5, δ2 =0(second column), the
impact of the cost-push shock on CPI inﬂation in the initial stage does not change.
I n d e e d ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 4 ) ,∆πc
ini =[ 1+ω(δ1−1)]∆π1−ωδ1∆qini =0 .7.Y e t ,a sw i l lb e
explained soon, after that the monetary instrument is set, when all the variables will
have reacted to the shock, the impact of the shock on CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period
will be four times as large as in the former case. Let us see what happens. As we said
above, a partial pass-through results in a loss in the eﬃciency of the direct exchange
rate channel. Thus, to aﬀect CPI inﬂation in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,t h eo p t i m a lm o n e t a r y
policy will have to increase the intensity of the impulse. This is apparent in row 4,
where the decrease of the nominal interest rate in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di sl a r g e rt h a ni nt h e
previous case of complete pass-through. The same happens to the real interest rate
(row 5) and, as a result, there is a second appreciation of the real exchange rate (equal
to −3.5). This appreciation reduces CPI inﬂation of ωδ13.5 ' 0.52 and, coupled with
the previous one, leads the real exchange rate in the ﬁrst period to −4.5 (row 6).
18This notwithstanding, CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period is 0.17 (row 1), four times as
large as in the complete pass-through case, implying that the direct exchange rate
channel is able to absorb only 74% of the shock on CPI inﬂation (against more than
94% in the previous case). This result shows that even with a partial pass-through,
the central bank loses to a signiﬁcant extent the capacity to stabilize CPI inﬂation in
the short run.
The cases of delayed pass-through reported in the third and forth columns have
been selected to show the behavior of the economy when ν =0 .05 and the pass-
through is just enough to stabilize πc
1, (δ1 =0 .7, δ2 =0 .3), a n dw h e nt h a ti sn o
longer feasible (δ1 =0 .4, δ2 =0 .6). What stands out is a diﬀerent manoeuvre of the
interest rate in the short and medium term (row 4), which is motivated by a diﬀerent
working of the transmission mechanism. When the direct exchange rate channel no
longer allows πc to be completely stabilized (row 1 fourth column), monetary policy
tends to replace it with the aggregate demand channel. This eﬀect can be seen in the
slightly lower variability of domestic inﬂation and the output gap (second and third
rows respectively).
Let us consider now shocks that come from the foreign side. The ﬁrst general
remark is that the shocks in foreign inﬂation or income or exchange risk premium tend
to have a similar qualitative impact on the economy due to the fact that they share,
to a large extent, the same transmission mechanism. Indeed, the foreign economy
is assumed to set the monetary policy according to the Taylor rule. Thus a change
in either foreign inﬂation or income has the same qualitative impact on the foreign
interest rate, and this latter rate and the foreign exchange risk premium, in turn,
have the same eﬀect on the domestic interest rate through the uncovered parity
condition. In addition, foreign inﬂation and income have a similar impact on the
demand of domestically produced goods via the aggregate demand channel.
If we consider, for example, a foreign inﬂation shock (Figure 3), we see that CPI
inﬂation either in the case of complete or incomplete and delayed pass-through is
completely insulated (row 1). This insulation is due to the fact that the monetary
policy uses the direct exchange rate channel in a way such that the shock does not
propagate to CPI inﬂation through the real exchange rate. Indeed, for the ﬁrst two
periods, the real exchange rate is kept at its long run equilibrium value (row 6). It is
interesting to note that when the pass-through is incomplete or delayed, there is less
variability of the domestic inﬂation and the output gap (second and third row). The
reason is that with imperfect pass-through a signiﬁcant part of the change in the real
exchange rate stemming from the shock does not arrive to CPI inﬂation.
3.2.2 Flexible CPI inﬂation targeting
Figures 4-5 show the impulse response functions of the economy to a cost-push shock
and a foreign shock when the central bank pursues ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting.
All in all, monetary policy stabilizes the output gap more at the cost of higher CPI
19inﬂation. When the cost push shock hits the economy (Figure 4), delayed pass-
through results in higher CPI inﬂation in the short run. On the contrary, when
the foreign shock hits the economy (Figure 5), moving from the case of complete
to the cases of incomplete and delayed pass-through, CPI inﬂation turns out to be
more insulated. The reason is that with imperfect pass-through, CPI inﬂation is
more shielded by foreign shocks due to the lower eﬃciency of the direct exchange
rate channel. At the same time, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting moves the focus on the
medium term stabilization of CPI inﬂation in favor of a more stable output gap. This
implies that the monetary policy uses the direct exchange rate channel less and the
aggregate demand channel more.
The minor use of the direct exchange rate channel is reﬂected in the very similar
variabilities of the real exchange rate for diﬀerent kinds and degrees of pass-through
(last row of Figure 4 and 5). Further simulations not reported here show that these
variabilities converge to the complete pass-through case variability when some interest
rate smoothing is introduced at the cost of a slightly larger CPI inﬂation variability.
This means that ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting stabilizes both the output gap and
the real exchange rate (in addition to CPI inﬂation). This outcome diﬀers from some
previous results obtained in the strict CPI inﬂation targeting cases. There, as long as
the optimal monetary policy could bring CPI inﬂation on target, a fall in the pass-
through determined a more aggressive use of the direct exchange rate channel and a
larger variability of the real exchange rate.
It is noteworthy that this result is in contrast with previous ﬁndings in the lit-
erature discussed in the introduction where imperfect pass-through leads to a larger
exchange rate variability.
3.3 Short run CPI inﬂation stabilization
It could be thought that as soon as there is some degree of pass-through in the ﬁrst
period, δ1 ∈ (0,1], δ2 ∈ [0,1], and no interest smoothing, i.e. ν =0 ,c u r r e n tC P I
inﬂation immediately goes back under the full control of monetary policy, as this
variable is again a function of the real exchange rate. Yet, this is not generally true.
In the case of delayed pass-through, the central bank cannot stabilize πc in the short
run for a wide range of values of δ1.
The reason is that when δ1 decreases, the direct exchange rate channel is less
eﬃcient and consequently larger changes in qt are required to stabilize πc
t. These
changes in qt introduce new shocks on πc in periods t+1and t+2a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 4 ) ,
and their absolute values are directly linked to the value of qt. In particular, the shock





∂qt−2 = −ωδ2. When δ2 ≥ δ1, this impact has an absolute value,
respectively, larger or equal to the eﬃciency of the direct exchange channel, ωδ1, so
that if the monetary policy used the direct exchange rate channel to absorb the shock
in period t then it would create a shock larger or equal in period t +2 . Thus, when
20δ2 ' 0.5 optimal monetary policy has to reduce the use of the direct exchange rate
channel to avoid instability13.
This result can be illustrated considering the impulse response functions to a
cost-push shock for diﬀerent degrees of the pass-through. In Figure 6, the ﬁrst,
second, third and fourth columns plot the impulse response functions in the cases
of (δ1 =0 .6, δ2 =0 .4), (δ1 =0 .56, δ2 =0 .44), (δ1 =0 .52, δ2 =0 .48) and
(δ1 = δ2 =0 .5).
The ﬁrst three graphics in the fourth row show how the manoeuvre of the interest
rate becomes more sophisticated when the share of the delayed pass-through rises and
the monetary policy uses the direct exchange rate channel to completely stabilize CPI
inﬂation. The tendency towards a more apparent ’roller coaster path’ for the interest
rate is determined by the fall in the eﬃciency of the direct exchange rate channel and
the increasing relevance of the subsequent shocks introduced by the monetary policy.
These shocks are too big to be absorbed for δ1 < 0.52 and stand out, all of a sudden,
in the last graphic of the ﬁrst row.
The case of delayed pass-through with ν =0is informative in pointing to the best
that the monetary authorities can do to stabilize CPI inﬂation. However, Figure 6,
row 4 shows that it is somehow unrealistic. The same problem occurs in the case of
incomplete pass-through with ν =0 , where strict CPI inﬂation targeting can stabilize
πc
1, but the interest rate is characterized by huge variations.
When the weight on instrument smoothing is more realistic, the relationship be-
tween CPI inﬂation and the degree of pass-through shifts upwards, and the degree of
pass-through required to fully stabilize CPI inﬂation in the short run increases.
This further result for the case of incomplete pass-through is reported in Figure 7,
which shows πc
1 as a function of the degree of exchange rate pass-through considering
diﬀerent values of the weight ν placed on instrument smoothing. Also this experiment
















13The role of the shocks introduced by the exchange rate movements in generating instability is
considered also by Ball (1998) in the discussion of the perils of inﬂation targeting.
21Figure 7. First period CPI inﬂation and degree of pass-through for diﬀerent interest
rate smoothing parameters.
This result is more pronounced in the case of delayed pass-through that is not
reported here.
Summing up, the degree and the kind of pass-through and the degree of interest
smoothing signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the capacity of monetary policy to stabilize CPI
inﬂation in the short run.
3 . 4 M e d i u mt e r mC P Ii n ﬂation stabilization
A crucial factor for a successful monetary policy is the management of the private
sector expectations on future monetary policy. To steer eﬀectively the expectations
the central bank needs high credibility and, consequently, if credibility is an issue, a
quick way to build it is targeting inﬂation strictly at the cost of less output stability.
Once the central bank is credible, strict inﬂation targeting loses much of its appeal and
output gap stabilization gains more attention. For this reason, in the medium term,
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is very likely to occur. When we consider the medium term
it is interesting to focus on how the pass-through aﬀects the variability of CPI inﬂation
and the output gap rather than the short run levels of these variables. Figure 8 and 9
refer to the cases of incomplete and delayed pass-through and show the Taylor curves
for diﬀerent values of δ1 and δ2. In order to focus on the role of the pass-through, it
is assumed that there is no interest smoothing, i.e. ν =0 .
In the case of incomplete pass-through, a decrease of δ1 worsens the trade-oﬀ be-
tween CPI inﬂation and output stability for low values of the variance of CPI inﬂation
but improves it for larger values. What happens here is based on the decreasing eﬃ-
ciency of the direct exchange rate channel and on the impact of the shock generated




(14). When the ineﬃcient direct exchange rate channel is the main way to stabilize
CPI inﬂation, monetary policy has to use it more intensively. As a result, the larger
impact of the shock determined by qt−1 causes larger output gap variability, which
worsens the trade-oﬀ. The second one, the improving of the trade-oﬀ,d e p e n d so nt h e
larger insulation from foreign shocks and the minor use of the direct exchange rate
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Figure 8. Taylor curves for incomplete pass-through cases.
I nt h ec a s eo fd e l a y e dp a s s - t h r o u g ht h eb e h a v i o ro ft h et r a d e - o ﬀ becomes more
complex. Figure 9 (a) and (b) show, respectively, the cases in which δ1 ∈ [0,0.52)
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Figure 9. Taylor curves for delayed pass-through cases.
In (a), the trade-oﬀ behaves exactly as in the case of incomplete pass-through:
when the pass-through is more delayed the trade-oﬀ worsens under strict CPI inﬂation
targeting and improves under ﬂexible targeting. On the contrary, in (b) the opposite
result occurs: the trade-oﬀ improves under strict inﬂation targeting and worsens
under ﬂexible.
When δ1 ∈ [0,0.52),t h el o w e rδ1 is, the harder it is to exert some eﬀect on CPI
inﬂation in the short run. Then, under strict CPI inﬂation targeting, the trade-oﬀ
worsens. When δ1 ∈ [0.52,1], it is possible to stabilize CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period
and the impact of the shock generated by the monetary policy in the second period
via qt−1 in eq. (14) decreases with δ1









¯ ¯ ¯ decreases for δ1 −→ 0.52.
23CPI inﬂation in the short run and, consequently, the trade-oﬀ improves under strict
CPI inﬂation targeting. At the same time, the impact of the shock generated by the
monetary policy in the third period is inversely linked to δ1, and this dependence
tends to worsen the trade-oﬀ under ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting.
These ﬁndings are noteworthy because they introduce the consideration of the
kind and degree of pass-through in the decision of how gradual the stabilization of
CPI inﬂation should be. Thus, it is important for the central bank to determine
where the pass-through is generated and to asses its size.
In addition, low and stable inﬂation may lead to delayed pass-through via the
expectations of inﬂation persistence (Taylor, 2000) and/or to incomplete pass-through
by promoting LCP (Devereux and Engel, 2001). Consequently, the monetary policy
could have an important role to determine the kind and degree of pass-through in
the medium term.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I have analyzed the relation between the exchange rate pass-through and
the optimal monetary policy for a small open-economy pursuing inﬂation-targeting.
The framework used is the Svensson (2000) model extended to take into account
imperfect pass-through.
The results obtained are, ﬁrst and foremost, that the kind and degree of pass-
through play an important role in the capacity of the central bank to stabilize CPI
inﬂation in the short run. With no pass-through, optimal monetary policy cannot
aﬀect CPI inﬂation at all in the short run, and with imperfect pass-through and some
realistic interest smoothing, it loses a signiﬁcant part of its latitude. In particular,
delayed pass-through turns out to reduce monetary policy eﬀectiveness more than
incomplete pass-through. These results contrast with the conventional wisdom, ac-
cording to which the ability to move the exchange rate allows the central bank to
aﬀect CPI inﬂation in the short run.
Second, considering how inﬂation targeting chooses optimally the various chan-
nels in the transmission mechanism, I ﬁnd that imperfect pass-through increases the
variability of the real exchange rate only in a subset of strict CPI inﬂation targeting
cases. The size of this subset, in turn, depends on the degree of interest smoothing
and the kind and degree of pass-through. Taking into account that CPI ﬂexible in-
ﬂation targeting is more relevant in practice than strict CPI inﬂation targeting, and
that central banks seem to smooth the interest rate to some extent, the model shows
that the impact of imperfect pass-through on the variability of the real exchange rate
is limited to few cases. This outcome tends to be in contrast with previous ﬁndings
in the literature where, in general, imperfect pass-through leads to a larger exchange
rate variability. Considering the policy implications of this result, further research is
important to explain how the transmission mechanism and the lag structure deter-
mine this diﬀerence.
24Third, the insulation of CPI inﬂa t i o nf r o ms h o c k st h a tc o m ef r o mt h ef o r e i g ns i d e
is inversely linked with the degree of pass-through.
Fourth, the kind and degree of pass-through aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between the sta-
bilization of both CPI inﬂation and the output gap. Speciﬁcally, with incomplete
pass-through, a fall in the degree of pass-through sharpens the trade-oﬀ under strict
CPI inﬂation targeting but improves it under ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting. With
delayed pass-through, when most of the change in import costs is delayed until the
next period, the trade-oﬀ becomes signiﬁcantly more pronounced under strict CPI
inﬂation targeting but slightly improves under ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting. On
the other hand, when a small part of the change in import costs is delayed until
t h en e x tp e r i o d ,t h et r a d e - o ﬀ improves. Hence, kind and degree of pass-through are
relevant in the decision of how gradual the stabilization of CPI inﬂation should be.
Finally, interest smoothing constrains the ability of the central bank to stabilize
CPI inﬂation in the short run and, with delayed pass-through this constrains is stricter
than with incomplete pass-through.
These ﬁndings are all grounded on thef a c tt h a tt h ep a s s - t h r o u g ha ﬀects the
eﬃciency of the direct exchange rate channel in the transmission of the monetary im-
pulse and foreign shocks and, on the other hand, makes more relevant the endogenous
shocks generated by the monetary policy itself.
Two natural extensions of this analysis are introducing (i) endogenous pass-
through and (ii) the casual relation from the monetary policy to the kind and degree
of pass-through in a Taylor (2000) or Devereux and Engel, (2001) style. In this case,
considering that the trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of CPI inﬂation and the out-
put gap could be improved by aﬀecting the kind and the degree of pass-through, there
could arise a more eﬃcient equilibrium.
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A Conditions on the sum of the interest rates
A.1 Benchmark case
To obtain equation (22) in the text, ﬁrst substitute δ1 =1 , δ2 =0in (17). Then,
































and considering (21) we ﬁnally arrive to (22).
A.2 General case
Solving equation (15) for qt yields
qt = 1
ωδ1 {−[1 − ω(1 − δ1)]πt − ωδ2πt−1 − ωδ2 (qt−1 − qt−2)} + qt−1
Since the variables qt−1,q t−2 are predetermined, assuming that in t−1 and t−2 the
economy was in steady state implies qt−1 =0 ,q t−2 =0 . Then the previous equation
yields
qt = −
[1 − ω(1 − δ1)]
ωδ1
πt (24)





−[1 − ω(1 − δ1)]πt+1|t − ωδ2πt + ωδ2qt−1 − ωδ1qt+1|t
ª
Assuming that in t − 1 and t − 2 the economy was in steady state, and letting
a ≡ 1
ω(δ2−δ1),b ≡ [1 − ω(1 − δ1)],c ≡ ωδ2 and d ≡− ωδ1 the previous equation
can be rewritten as
qt = −abπt+1|t − acπt + adqt+1|t









τ πt+τ|t + lim
τ→∞(ad)
τ qt+τ+1|t
Since limτ→∞ qt+τ+1|t =0and ad =
−ωδ1
ω(δ2−δ1) if δ1 6= δ2 it follows that limτ→∞ (ad)
τ qt+τ+1|t =










[1 − ω(1 − δ1)]πt+1+τ|t − ωδ2πt+τ|t
ª
(25)
Now, combining (24) with (25) yields the equation that the expected inﬂation
forward looking variables have to fulﬁlt oh a v eπc
t =0 ,
−











[1 − ω(1 − δ1)]πt+1+τ|t − ωδ2πt+τ|t
ª
(26)
26Note that for δ1 =1and δ2 =0we obtain −πt =
∞ X
τ=0
πt+1+τ|t which is equivalent
to eq. (21) determined before.
Using the previous notation and expanding the inﬁnite sum, we can simplify eq




−cπt +( b − dac)πt+1|t + da(b − dac)πt+2|t +( da)
2 (b − dac)πt+3|t + ...
ª
⇐⇒ (b








































t + ψt + f (qt−1 − qt−2)+gπt+1|t
Then, leading any variable τ periods, taking the expectation at period t and
multiplying both side for the factor (da)
τ yields
(da)
τ it+τ|t = e(da)
τ πt+τ|t + f (da)
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τ it+τ|t =[ eπt + e(da)πt+1|t + e(da)
2πt+2|t + ... + fπt−1 + fdaπt + f (da)
2 πt+1|t
+ ... + gπt+1|t + g(da)πt+2|t + g(da)
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2 qt+1|t + ... − qt−2 − (da)qt−1 − (da)



































































Since the right hand side is predetermined, this equation establishes the condition
that the sum of all current and expected interest rate have to satisfy to have πc
t =0 .
As in the case of δ1 =1 , δ2 =0 , the central bank use this condition and the reaction
function (eq. (17) in the paper) to determine in any period t the the optimal monetary





Note that setting δ1 =1 , δ2 =0we have da =1 ,e=0 ,f=0 ,g= ω−1
ω and (29)
boils down to (22).
B State-space form of the model
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Yt is the (column) vector of goal variables, Yt =( πc
t,πt,y t,i t,i t − it−1)
0 ,
and the matrixes A, B, B1,C Z and Ci are given, respectively, by
A =





βye3 − βρA14 + β∗
yγ∗






























1−απ(−απe12 +[ 1+αy (βρ + βq)+αq]e15 − αyβyA3 + αyβρA14 − αyβ∗
yγ∗
yA5



























1−απ [αy (1 + βy)(βρ + βq)+αq]

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
where, using the Svensson’s deﬁnitions, ej,j=0 ,...,15 stands for a 1x15 row
vector that for j =0h a sa l lt h ee l e m e n t se q u a lt oz e r oa n df o rj 6=0has element j
equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero; Aj stands for row j of the matrix
A.
Finally, the matrix K is a diagonal matrix with (µc
π,µ π,λ,µ i,νi) along the main
diagonal.
At this point the algorithm used by Oudiz and Sachs (1985) as well as by Backus
and Driﬃl (1986) for the solution of the optimization problem in the dynamic pro-
gramming framework is applied and a detailed description is provided by Soderlind
(1998) and (1999). For the problem raised by the presence of future controls, see the
working paper version of Svensson (2000).
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second, third and forth columns, δ1, δ2 are equal, respectively, to (1, 0), (0.5, 0),
(0.7, 0.3) and (0.4, 0.6).
35Figure 5. Flexible inﬂation targeting. IRF to a foreign inﬂation shock. ν =0 . In the
ﬁrst, second, third and forth columns, δ1, δ2 are equal, respectively, to (1, 0), (0.5,
0), (0.7, 0.3) and (0.4, 0.6).
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ﬁrst, second, third and fourth column, δ1, δ2 are equal, respectively, to (0.6, 0.4),
(0.56, 0.44), (0.52, 0.48) and (0.5, 0.5).
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